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We show how di¤erent competitive regimes a¤ect the ability to
provide incentives based on noisy information systems. Reduced com-
petition facilitates incentive provision. This may rationalize both ver-
tical integration and horizontal integration as seen in many agricul-
tural markets with uncertain quality grading. Moreover, if trading
terms are settled before the information is observed, a noisy infor-
mation system su¢ces to give proper incentives. This may rationalize
the use of long term conditional price contracts in the trading of many
agricultural products.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Most information systems are uncertain. This includes most systems used
to grade agricultural products. Not only will they contain statistical mea-
surement errors. More importantly, the relationship between a producer’s
(seller’s, agent’s, etc.) e¤ort or other characteristics and the resulting mea-
surement will be stochastic. The uncertainty makes the inference one can
1make about a producer’s behavior or characteristics less precise. This may
complicate incentive provision.
In this paper, we consider the problem of controlling the incentives of risk-
neutral producers. With risk neutrality, noise need not be a problem. Since
there is no risk sharing concerns, one can costlessly use a more high-powered
incentive scheme based on the noisy information. This may give …rst-best
incentives as long as the information system is at least slightly informative.
In a competitive environment, however, a noisy information system is less
useful. If there are multiple processors (buyers, principals, etc.), and if trad-
ing conditions are settled after the information is observed, the competition
among the processors forces them to pay the expected value given the infor-
mation signal. This limits the ability to provide incentives based on noisy
information systems.
The di¢culty of providing incentives in a competitive environment may
rationalize horizontal as well as vertical integration.
Horizontal integration of the processors transforms the set-up from a com-
petitive to a monopsonistic one. This allows the processors to deviate from
expected value payment and therefore to use more high powered incentive
schemes. This may for example rationalize agricultural procurement boards.
Horizontal integration of producers transforms the set-up to one of a
monopoly. Again, this allows the producer’s to deviate from o¤ering expected
value payment and hereby reduces the incentive problem. This may explain
the use of marketing boards and bargaining associations in agricultural pro-
duction where grading may not be entirely precise, - cf. e.g. Chalfant ea
(1999).
Vertical integration ties the processor and one or more producers together
for at least a period of time. In the full integration case, the processor
and producers merge. It is often held that vertical integration mitigates
incentive con‡icts by internalizing the incentive con‡icts, cf. e.g. Williamson
(1971). Usually, it is believed that there are better information systems
and others means of rewarding and punishing the agents inside a …rm than
between …rms. We suggest that reduced competition may be a speci…c way
in which vertical integration can improve the use of information systems and
the possibilities of reward and punishment. In turn, this may rationalize the
widespread industrialization of agricultural production through the use of
production and marketing contracts.
Since Akerlof’s (1970) classic article about lemons in the used car mar-
ket there has been several suggestions on how to improve the incentives in a
2market with imperfect testing. Leland (1979) analyzes how licensing (or min-
imum quality constraints) can improve product quality. Heinkel (1981) shows
how the use of penalties in a rank order tournament based on an imperfect
test can reduce the lemons problem. However, the approach suggested by
Heinkel does not in general implement …rst-best, because the penalty implies
a direct welfare loss (burning money). Mason and Sterbenz (1994) analyze
the incentives for producers to undertake costly certi…cation. The producers
are able to conceal information about unfavorable test results. This approach
can lead to improved as well as a reduced incentives compared to the case
of no testing. Hollander ea (1999) take the …rms’ quality levels as given and
explores the incentives to participate in voluntary grading for high and low
quality …rms, respectively. These papers mainly focus on information prob-
lems between processors and the consumers. Our focus is on information
problems between producers and processors.
The paper most directly related to the present is probably Hennessy
(1996) who suggests that vertical integration may be a way to overcome
the di¢culties of grading agricultural products. A related paper focussing
on noisy grading systems is Chalfant ea (1999). They develop a theoretical
model showing that grading errors will lead to wrong incentives. They claim
that their results do not rely on assumptions about the competitive regime:
”We need make no assumptions about the manner in which farm prices are
set, or the competitive relationships involved in that price-setting process”
Chalfant ea (1999, p. 60).
We argue that the competitive relationship and the price setting process
is in fact a key issue when trying to understand the implications of noisy
information systems. Competition leads to under-utilization of information
systems. This implies that vertical integration is only one of a series of
remedies. We show that the problem does not exist in a competitive regime
if there is no trade after grading, and we argue that this is likely to be the case
in the examples considered by Hennessy (1996) and Chalfant ea (1999). We
also deviate by developing an explicit model of the resulting ine¢ciencies (in
terms of an under-supply of e¤ort or investment). Lastly, our set-up allows
us to relate the e¢ciency loss from competition to the characteristics in the
grading system.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model
and we identify the …rst-best outcome. In Section 3, the a posteriori compet-
itive outcome, i.e. the outcome when trade takes place after observing the
information system, is developed. In Section 4, we develop the outcome in
3case of a priori competition, i.e. when conditional trading terms are settled
before the actual information is observed. We also discuss the possibilities of
accomplishing this via vertical integration of producers and processors or via
horizontal integration of producers. In Section 5, we develop the monopson-
istic outcome corresponding to a horizontal integration of processors. Nu-
merical examples are provided in Section 6 and …nal remarks are given in
Section 7.
2 Production and Grading
We assume that both processors and producers are risk neutral and maximize
their expected pro…ts. Each producer produces and delivers one good to one
of the multiple processors. For simplicity, we assume that each processor can
process in…nitely many goods and that the processors’ reservation pro…ts are
zero. The producers’ production costs and reservation pro…ts are normalized
to zero as well.
Each producer has the possibility of making an investment that a¤ects
the value of his product. The (expected) value of the good to a processor
depends on the producer’s investment as follows
Value
Investment V0 + V
No Investment V0
i.e. the investment increases the value of the good from V0 ¸ 0 to V0 + V ,
where V ¸ 0:
The processor cannot directly monitor the producers’ behavior. They do
however get some signal about the quality of the products. The grade of the
good can be either H (high) or L (low). The probability of receiving these
grades given the investment behavior is
H L
Investment ® + ± 1 ¡ ® ¡ ±
No Investment ® 1 ¡ ®
where ®;± ¸ 0 and ® + ± · 1. Hence a more informative information
system is associated with larger values of ±: Even though we only focus on
two grades, all our results can easily be generalized to n grades.
4A producer’s actual cost of investing c is known only by him. The cu-
mulative distribution F (c) of c is common knowledge and satis…es F (c) > 0
and F 0 (c) > 0 for all c>0. The investment in quality improvement could
be the thinning of prune trees (as Chalfant ea (1999)), the investment in a
new refrigerated bulk storage tank (as Hennessy (1996)), soil improvements,
etc.
Since a producer’s investment cannot be observed by the processor, the
price o¤ered to the producer can only be conditioned on the signal from the
information system. Let PH be the producer’s payment if the signal is H
and PL the payment when the signal is L.
The producer will choose to invest if and only if
(® + ±)PH +( 1¡ ® ¡ ±)PL ¡ c ¸ ®PH +( 1¡ ®)PL
i.e. investing is incentive compatible if and only if
c · ±(PH ¡ PL) (1)
This shows that with grade dependent prices, a producer’s behavior is char-
acterized by a benchmark cost level, below which he invests and above which
he does not. This also means, that alternative payment schemes can be com-
pared through the benchmark costs that they generate. These properties
are shared by many models with private investment costs, cf. e.g. Antle ea
(1999, 2000).
In terms of participation, we have that a non-investing producer is willing
to produce under the (PH;P L) contract as long as
PH® + PL (1 ¡ ®) ¸ 0 (2)
Similarly an investing producer will participate if
PH (® + ±)+PL (1 ¡ ® ¡ ±) ¡ c ¸ 0 (3)
The last constraint is most demanding for high c values. Inserting the highest
c value leading to investment, i.e. c = ±(PH ¡ PL); into (3), we see that (3)
reduces to (2)1. Hence, in terms of participation, we simply must require (2).
1This is not surprising since the most costly type that invests, i.e. c = ±(PH ¡ PL),i s
indi¤erent between investing and not investing.
5The …rst-best investment plan is to invest as long as marginal value ex-
ceeds marginal cost, i.e.
c · V (4)
Let cFB b et h e… r s tb e s tc o s tb e n c h m a r k ,i . e .cFB = V . It follows from (1)
that to implement the …rst best level of investment using (PH;P L); we must
have
PH ¡ PL =
V
±
Note that a less informative system with a small ± makes it necessary to use
a more high powered or progressive incentive scheme with a large price gap
(PH ¡ PL) to implement …rst best investment.
3 A posteriori competition
Assume now that trade takes place after grading. We call this a posteriori





Figure 1: A posteriori trade
In this case competition among the processors force them to pay the
expected value of a good given its grade. This is obvious from a Bertrand-
like argument. Since prices can easily be altered, the competition eliminates
pro…t in the processing level. A producer will be payed at least the expected
value. The reason is that if a processor pays a producer less than the expected
value of his good given his grading, a second processor could o¤er to pay more
and still earn a positive pro…t. On the other hand, a producer can get no
more than the expected value of his good since a processor paying more would
be better o¤ foregoing the trade.
To develop the a posteriori competitive regime, we calculate the probabil-
ity that a producer has invested given the grading result. Let c be the highest
6cost type that chooses to invest. Hereby, F(c) is the a priori probability that
the producer invests. Using Bayes’ Rule, the a posteriori probability that he
invested when the processor receives the signal H is
p(invjH)=
F (c)(® + ±)
® + ±F (c)
and the probability that the producer invested when the signal is L,i s
p(invjL)=
F (c)(1¡ ® ¡ ±)
1 ¡ ® ¡ ±F (c)
Competition forces the processors to pay the expected value of the good given
its grade. This means that the prices PH and PL are
PH = Expected value of grade H (5)
= p(invjH)(V0 + V )+p(:invjH)V0
= V0 + p(invjH)V
= V0 +
F (c)(® + ±)
® + ±F (c)
V
PL = Expected value of grade L (6)
= p(invjL)(V0 + V )+p(:invjL)V0
= V0 + p(invjL)V
= V0 +
F (c)(1¡ ® ¡ ±)
1 ¡ ® ¡ ±F (c)
V
Given this price scheme and (1), the producers will choose to invest for all
costs below cCO where
c














(1 ¡ ® ¡ ±)
1 ¡ ® ¡ ±F (cCO)
#
±V (7)
7Also, using this investment strategy, the participation constraints are ful-
…lled. To see this, use cCO = ± (PH ¡ PL) to rewrite the most demanding
participation constraint (2) to ®cCO
± +PL ¸ 0. Inserting PL from (6), we see





F (c)(1¡ ® ¡ ±)
1 ¡ ® ¡ ±F (c)
V ¸ 0
which is always ful…lled.




Hence, there is a social loss from settling prices based on signals from a noisy
grading system. Competition forces the processors to pay expected values
and this leads to payment schemes that are not su¢ciently high powered to
encourage …rst best investment.
The obvious agricultural example of the a posteriori competitive regime
is trading of products at an auction. When vegetables, ‡owers, fur etc. are
brought to an auction, the processors can get a (noisy) signal of quality from
direct inspection of the products. The biding process therefore makes the
processors pay the a posteriori expected values. Another example of this
regime could be the trading of grain, where the farmers can get a sample
graded before trading.
Despite such examples, the a posteriori competitive regime is probably
not the most common in modern agriculture. Goods are often graded at
the processor after delivery from a producer and grade dependent prices are
usually settled before delivery.3
Hennessy (1996) and Chalfant ea (1999) both implicitly base their models
on the a posteriori competitive regime. Hennessy (1996) uses the case of a
dairy farmer investing in a new refrigerated bulk storage tank in order to










(1 ¡ ® ¡ ±)
1 ¡ ® ¡ ±F (cCO)
belong to [0;1]: The latter is a consequence of F
¡
cCO¢
;®;±;®+ ± all belonging to [0;1]:
3Of course, grading at the processor does not rule out the use of a posteriori competitive
prices. The a priori decided quality-price rule may be designed to generate a posteriori
prices.
8reduce milk bacterial counts. This case does not seem to …t the regime of
trade after grading, since the milk typically will not be graded until it is
delivered - there is no market for already graded milk. The regime developed
in the Section 4 may therefore be more appropriate. Chalfant ea (1999) use
the case of California prunes which are graded by the processor, but where
the prices are negotiated in advance and …xed for the season. This means that
the market for prunes does not correspond to the regime of a posteriori trade
because there is no competition after grading. Again, the regime developed
in Section 4 may be more appropriate.
4 A priori competition
When prices for the di¤erent grades are …xed in a competitive market before
the actual grading, we talk about the regime as one with a priori competition.





Figure 2: A Priori Trade
When trade takes place before grading, competition does not force the
processors to pay the expected value of the good given its grade. Rather,
competition forces the processors to pay the expected value of the good before
grading. Again this is based on a Bertrand-like argument. For producers who
have invested, this means that they should expect a payment of V0+V while
producers without investment should expect a payment of V0. We shall now
demonstrate this. Also, we shall demonstrate that the resulting investment
levels are …rst best.
The structure of the problem, including the risk neutrality, implies that
there are multiple equilibria. It is possible that several contracts exist simul-
taneously in the market, some attracting both investing and non-investing
producers (pooling contracts) and other attracting only investing or non-
investing producers (separating contracts). They all have the property, how-
ever, that the producers using a contract are paid the expected value of their
9production.
To see this and develop the basic properties of the outcome, let us assume
that (PL;P H) is (a non-trivial) part of an equilibrium. By this we mean that
at least one processor o¤er this contract to one or more of the producers and
that at least one producer actually chooses this contract. Now, let us assume
that the fraction ¯ of the producer types operating under (PL;P H) chooses
to invest and that the rest (1¡¯) chooses not to invest. Then we most have
¯[PH (® + ±)+PL(1 ¡ ® ¡ ±)] + (1 ¡ ¯)[PH (®)+PL (1 ¡ ®)]
= ¯[V0 + V ]+( 1¡ ¯)[V0]
since the left hand side is the expected payment to the producers and the
right hand side is the expected value they generate4.
We will now show that the expected payment not only equals expected
value when averaged over investing and not-investing producers, it holds for
the individual producers as well.
Consider …rst the case of a pooling contract,i . e .0 <¯<1.I nt h i sc a s e
we must have
PH (® + ±)+PL (1 ¡ ® ¡ ±)=V + V0 (8)
PH (®)+PL (1 ¡ ®)=V0 (9)
To see this, assume that we have > in (8) and < in (9). Hence, the processors
loose on the investing producers but gain on the non-investing ones. In this
case, a processor could modify the contract to (PH ¡¢=®;PL +¢ =(1¡®)).
This would not a¤ect the non-investing types, but the investing types would
be paid less. The processor will therefore be able to attract the same amount
of non-investing producers but he would loose less on the investing type (he
may not even attract any) and he would gain. Similarly, we cannot have
< in (8) and > in (9) since then a processor could modify the contract to
(PH +¢ =(® + ±);P L ¡ ¢=(1 ¡ ® ¡ ±)): This would not a¤ect the expected
4Formally, the proof of = runs as follows: We cannot have > since then the processor
su¤ers a strict loss and he would be better o¤ not o¤ering the contract. We cannot have
< since then one of the processors could increase all prices marginally to (PL+";PH +").
Hereby he would attract all the types that traded under the old contract and he would
only have to pay " more. I.e. a marginal increase in price would induce a non-marginal
increase in trade.
10payment to the investing types but it would reduce the payment to the
overpaid and loss generating non-investing producers. In summary, a pooling
contract must satisfy both (8) and (9). The price scheme satisfying these
restrictions is











In addition to the pooling contracts there exist separating contracts that
only attract the producers who have invested or those who have not in-
vested. Consider …rst contracts that only attract investing producers. This
corresponds to ¯ =1above and we get that any such contract must satisfy
(8) with equality and (9) with < since then the non-investing producers can






















1 ¡ ® ¡ ±
where " is positive. Similarly, the class of contracts that only attracts non-
investing producers solves (9) with equality and (8) with inequality <.T h i s
leads to a class of contracts (PNI
H ;PNI
L ) for non-investing (NI) producers
P
NI

















where ° is positive. Note that the pooling contract corresponds to the limit
case where ° = " =0 . Figure 3 below illustrates the di¤erent contracts.
We see that all producers in all contracts are paid their (expected) values
V + V0 and V0, respectively. Consequently, both processors and producers
are equally well o¤ in any separating contract and in the pooling contract.
Also, the participation constraint (2) is ful…lled.
Since the producers are paid the expected value of their product, we get
t h a tap r o d u c e rc h o o s e st oi n v e s ti f
V0 + V ¡ c ¸ V0
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Figure 3: Pooling and Separating Contracts
or equivalently
c · V (12)
This means that the …rst-best investment level is achieved in the a priori
competitive regime. In other words: noisy grading does not create incentive
problems in a competitive environment where trade occurs before grading
(as in the market for milk and the market for prunes).
Of course, these …rst-best levels of investment may also be reached by
altering the market situation through the use of marketing or production
contracts so that trade takes place before grading. This is the vertical inte-
gration solution suggested by Hennessy (1996).
Another possibility is to have a horizontal integration of producers.B y
forming a marketing board, the producers can make a take-it-or-leave-it of-
fer of the …rst-best price plan ((10)-(11)). Note that the producers here do
not form a sales coalition to get market power. In the a posteriori competitive
scenario the processors already compete and the producers have the market
power. The horizontal integration of producers serves however to mitigate the
problems of a posteriori competition in an environment with imperfect infor-
mation. By o¤ering the …rst-best price plan, the loss from under-investment
under a posteriori competition is eliminated. As an example, we suggest
that the horizontal integration of Californian prune growers should enable
the Prune Bargaining Association to eliminate the under-utilization of the
grading system caused by a posteriori competition. In our view, therefore, we
12cannot conclude that grading errors in the prune industry lead to incentive
problems as suggested by Chalfant ea (1999).
The a priori solution potentially su¤ers from enforcement problems. If
a producer acquires additional information about his product before he de-
livers, e.g. by simply inspecting his product, he may be tempted to sell his
product elsewhere, perhaps through a producer with a di¤erent contracts.
Any information (in excess of wether he invested or not) can be misused by
him. Moreover, it will be relatively expensive for a processor to enforce the
original contract through the legal system. The processor must take legal
action against each producer on individual basis. Similarly, there can be
enforcement problems with the processor who may refuse to pay the prices
he promised in the original contract. This enforcement problem, however, is
probably less severe because it is easy to prove whether the processor pays
the promised prices and because there are alternative buyers in the market.
5 Monopsonist processor
If the processors form a horizontal integration it will a¤ect the producers’
incentives to invest. There are two possible regimes under monopsony.
The …rst involves a posteriori trade, where the trading terms are settled
after grading. In this situation the monopsonist processor will make a classic
hold-up of the producers, who cannot sell their products to others. This
means that the monopsonist processor will o¤er the producers a prize of
zero regardless of the grade. Of course the producers will foresee this and
thus decide not to invest at all. The outcome of a posteriori trade under
monopsony is therefore a total lack of investment.
If, on the other hand, the trading terms are settled before the investment
decisions are made, i.e. a priori trade, the monopsonist is able to motivate
the producers to invest. This is the usual long term contract solution to
the hold-up situation. The monopsonist processor will however ration the
investments that the producers are induced to undertake. He does so to
reduce the ability of producers with low costs to claim high costs and thereby
extract high information rents.
The under-investment resulting from rationing can be more or less severe
than the under-investment resulting from a posteriori competition. This
suggests that the formation of a monopsonist regime may be preferred to (a
posteriori) competition.
13The enforcement problems of a long term, a priori trade contract, is
probably less severe in the monopsonist setting. A producer trying to misuse
new private information cannot sell his product elsewhere.
We shall now develop the monopsonist outcome in some details.
When the monopsonist o¤ers the contract (PH;P L), producers with costs
belowcM = ±(PH¡PL) will invest and the rest will not invest. It is convenient
to parametrize the monopsonist problem in terms of PL and cM.
The monopsonist’s expected revenue on an average producer is
REV





















































The monopsonist will maximize this pro…t by choosing cM and PL appropri-
ately. Of course, he must respect the de…ning constraint cM = ±(PH ¡PL) as
well as the participation constraint (2). Inserting the former into the latter,




Partial optimization with respect to PL gives PL = ¡®cM
± and the monop-












5Given a solution to this, we can of course establish the optimal payment scheme using




(1 ¡ ®);P L = ¡®
cM
±













i.e. the monopsonist processor induces an investment threshold of cM where
cM solves67
c






This shows that a monopsonistic regime will induce under-investment
c
M <V
If however, the so-called hazard rate F(:)=F 0(:) is not too steep, the level
of investment under monopsony may be larger than the investment under a
posteriori competition. Hence, a monopsonist may be socially superior to a
(posteriori) competitive regime. We shall provide some examples in Section 6.
We will even show that the monopsonist may be preferable to the producers
as well.
Note that the optimal level of investment is independent of the quality of
the information system, i.e. ® and ±. The intuition behind this is that the
processor is free to choose the right span in prices to induce the wanted level
of investment and then adjust PL to match the participation constraint. By
risk neutrality, the noise and associated use of more high powered schemes
is not costly.
6 Numerical examples
To illustrate the di¤erent levels of investment in the di¤erent competitive
regimes, we consider a case where c is uniformly distributed in the interval
6This requires that F0 (c) > 0 and that the second order condition holds:
(V ¡ c)F00 (c) ¡ 2F0 (c) · 0
i.e. F (c) can not be ”too convex”. If these requirements are not met, the level of invest-
ment will be c =0 .
7This is a classical condition for investment problems where there is no noise in the
observation of investment amount but asymmetric information about investment cost, cf
for example Antel and Eppen(1985). As proved above, it extends to cases with noise in
the observation of the investment amount, i.e. with moral hazard as well.
15[0;1] i.e. F (c)=c and F0 (c)=1 . Furthermore we assume that V =1 ,
V0 =0 , ® =0 :3 and ± =0 :5. Hence, …rst-best outcome is cFB =1 .
In this case, a posteriori competition will lead to investment if c · cCO ,
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The polynomial has roots f0;0:0938;1:7062g hence cCO =0 :09388.







Hence with the given parameter values, posteriori competition causes more
distortion in the investment than monopsony with a priori price settling.
If the grading system changes so that ® =0 :1 and ± =0 :8; the competitive










with roots f0;0:625;1:375g, i.e. investment in the competitive context in-
creases to cCO =0 :625. The monopsonistic outcome does not depend on the
quality of the information system, i.e. cM =0 :5 as before. Hence, with these
parameter values, competition leads to better investment decisions.
It seems counter-intuitive that the producers can be better o¤ if the
regime is monopsonistic rather than competitive, but it is nevertheless the
case. The average payment to the producers under monopsony is PAYM =
8By the analysis in Section 3, investment takes place for all c less than or equal to the
right hand side of (7). This corresponds to the condition
cCO
³




and the left, non-zero solution is therefore the relevant solution.
16F (c)c (as can be argued directly or derived by inserting PL = ¡®cM
± into
(14)). In the case of uniform distribution c » [0;1]; the expected payment




of producers investing is cM
2 . This gives an average in-




2 = cM cM
2 =0 :125; and the average
pro…t per producer becomes ¼M =0 :25 ¡ 0:125 = 0:125 irrespectively of
the characteristics of the information system. In the competitive regime the














































(1 ¡ ® ¡ ±)
1 ¡ ® ¡ ±F (cCO)
V
If we use the numbers of the …rst case (® =0 :3, ± =0 :5 and cCO =
0:0938), the producers will obtain an average payment of 0:09389.T h e a v -




2 =0 :0044 and the average
pro…t per producer is therefore ¼CO =0 :0938 ¡ 0:0044 = 0:0894.I nt h es e c -
ond case (® =0 :1, ± =0 :8 and cCO =0 :625) the producers obtain an average





this gives an average pro…t per producer of ¼CO =0 :4297.
Comparing and ¼M and ¼CO; we see that the producers may be either
better o¤ or worse o¤ in a competitive regime compared to a monopsonistic
regime.
In the …gures below we have evaluated the monopsonistic and the com-
petitive regimes for all values of ® and ±.W eu s et h es a m ea s s u m p t i o n sa s
in the examples above.
9Note that the average payment corresponds to the benchmark cost in the uniform case
considered here. This is intuitively obvious since F
¡
cCO¢
= cCO is the fraction investing.
Each investing producer generates a value of V =1 , and competition forces the processors
to pay expected value.
17Figure 4 shows the values of ® and ± where (a priori) monopsony leads
to higher investment than (a posteriori) competition. We see that this is
the case when the grading system is relatively noisy, i.e. has low ±10.T h e
intuition is that a noisy grading system increases the under-investment under
competition caused by the necessity to pay expected value given the grading
result. A more noisy grading system, on the other hand, does not a¤ect the
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Figure 4: Region where cM >c CO
Figure 5 shows the values of ® and ± where the producers prefer that the
processors to form a monopsony rather than to compete. The …gure shows
that monopsony is preferred when the quality signal is relatively noisy, i.e. ±
is small.11
10The curvature of the boarder line can be understood as follows. When ® is low,
observation of grade H is a clear signal of investment. This means that a relatively small
± is su¢cient to give incentives under competition. On the other hand, when ®+± is close
to one observing grade L is a clear signal of no investment. This explains why smaller ±
is su¢cient to give proper incentives, when ® increases above a certain level.
11For small values of ®, even small values of ± su¢ces to make H a precise indication
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Figure 5: Region where ¼M >¼ CO
If the quality of the information system is too low, there will be no in-
vestment under a posteriori competition. Figure 6 shows the values of ® and
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Figure 6: Region where cCO =0
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have illustrated how competition may cripple the use of a
noisy information system for incentive purposes.
Disregarding risk sharing concerns because of the mutual risk neutrality,
…rst-best implementation is possible if the information system is just slightly
informative. This requires, however, that there is no competition among the
processors after the revelation of signals - a priori competition.I ns u c hc a s e s ,
19we can simply use more high powered incentives to compensate for the lack
of reliable information. This contradicts previous claims in the agricultural
economics literature on grading.
With competition after grading - a posteriori competition -t h en e e dt o
pay expected values of each grade makes it impossible to motivate …rst-best
investment choices. The reason is that payment of expected values does not
allow su¢ciently high powered incentive schemes.
A monopsonist using a posteriori price settling will not be able to in-
duce any investment because of the hold-up problem that the producers
face. A monopsonist using a priori pricing (long term contracts) can avoid
the hold-up problem. To save on information rents, he will however ration
the producer types that are induced to invest.
These observations are summarized in …gure 7 below.














Figure 7: Regimes and Issues
Enforcement of long term contracts are easier under monopsony than
competition. One reason for this is that a producer acquiring additional
information before grading would be tempted to sell his products outside
the contract - and that such contract breaches may be hard to observe and
penalize. We suggest therefore that the most relevant comparison is between
a priori monopsony and a posteriori competition.
Our main …nding is now that a monopsonist regime may be superior to a
competitive one. The loss from rationing introduced by a monopsonist may
be more than o¤set by the increase in investment caused by its ability to use
a more high powered payment plan. Hence, it may be socially advantageous
to induce the processors to collude. A monopsonist may also be favorable to
producers since their pro…ts may be higher in a monopsonist regime than in
a competitive one.
Although this is a simple set of observations, they seem to have many po-
tential applications. In particular, they may rationalize horizontal and ver-
tical integrations simply because such integrations reduce competition and
20thereby allow for stronger incentives. They may also explain why it is com-
mon in agricultural markets that grading takes place at the processors with
trading terms settled before the actual grading.
Our …ndings can be made subject to empirical tests. One of the hypothe-
sis of our model is that investments under a priori competition is higher than
under a posteriori competition. Another is that there will be more a pri-
ori trading in markets with noisy grading compared to markets with precise
grading. A third is that monopsony is more likely when grading is imprecise.
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